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Commentary: Reflections on Remorse
Stephen J. Morse, JD, PhD
This commentary on Zhong et al. begins by addressing the definition of remorse. It then primarily focuses on the
relation between remorse and various justifications for punishment commonly accepted in Anglo-American
jurisprudence and suggests that remorse cannot be used in a principled way in sentencing. It examines whether
forensic psychiatrists have special expertise in evaluating remorse and concludes that they do not. The final section
is a pessimistic meditation on sentencing disparities, which is a striking finding of Zhong et al.
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 42:49 –55, 2014

Zhong et al.1 have presented the results of a qualitative study of how judges use the concept of remorse
in sentencing. Although the study has numerous
methodological limitations that the authors admirably recognize, it is an interesting paper and a useful
catalyst for further reflections on remorse. This commentary focuses on the relation between remorse and
various justifications for punishment that are commonly accepted in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Zhong et al. addressed this relation, but briefly, and I
wish to expand their discussion. I will also consider
the role forensic psychiatry should play in helping to
evaluate whether a defendant is in fact remorseful in
cases in which remorse is considered. I begin, however, by addressing the definition of remorse that
guides the discussion. I conclude by briefly considering what I consider to be the study’s most striking
finding: the extensive variability in how judges use
remorse at sentencing.
The Definition of Remorse
Zhong et al. use a definition of remorse adopted
from Proeve and Tudor2:
Remorse may be defined as a distressing emotion that arises
from acceptance of personal responsibility for an act of
harm against another person. Often, with further reflection, the remorseful individual may desire that the act had
never occurred at all and wish to make restitution toward
the victim [Ref. 1, p 41].
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It is useful to compare this definition with the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) entry3:
Deep regret or guilt for doing something morally wrong;
the fact or state of feeling sorrow for committing a sin;
repentance, compunction.

Although similar, they are somewhat different.
Consider the similarities. In both, there is a cognitive
and an affective component. The agent makes the
judgment that he has done something wrong and,
explicitly for the former and implicitly for the latter,
accepts responsibility for the harm caused. The definition Zhong et al. used is ambiguous about both
wrong and the acceptance of responsibility. An agent
who causes harm accidentally as a result of intentional bodily movement is causally responsible for
harming the victim and may take responsibility because it was his action that caused the harm. But has
the agent wronged the victim? It seems that the agent
might properly feel what Bernard Williams calls
“agent-regret” (Ref. 4, p 27) because the agent has
caused harm, but genuine remorse would be inappropriate because no moral wrong has been done and
there is no moral responsibility for the harm. Agentregret would be distressing, but guilty feelings would
not be justified. In contrast, the OED makes clear
that the judgment must be of a moral wrong. This
aspect of the definition would be especially relevant
at sentencing because the convicted defendant has
been found to be morally culpable. To see this most
clearly, consider a crime of strict liability. The convicted agent should not feel guilty, but might properly feel agent-regret if innocent victims were
harmed. Remorse is a distinctively moral reaction.
I leave aside cases involving regulatory or malum
prohibitum crimes. Even in these, however, there is
a point to be made that conviction implies a moral
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violation to some degree.5 Crimes of strict liability
are a clear exception, but they are also notoriously
controversial because they condemn and punish
without fault.
The definition of remorse in Zhong et al. is also
nonspecific about what the distressing emotions
should be. Agent-regret might be profoundly distressing, but not because it is a proper result of guilty
feelings and repentance would not be appropriate.
Moral regret and guilt are the proper response to
moral wrongdoing. Moreover, remorseful feelings
of regret and guilt need not be distressing for the
remorse to be genuine. In some cases, these feelings
may be cleansing and help the agent feel that the
moral balance is somewhat restored by an appropriate reaction.
Both definitions include a desire that the harm
had not occurred and that the pre-harm state can be
restored. I think this desire is implicit in the notion of
regret. Remorse may also imply a feeling of nostalgia
for an earlier, innocent time, a suggestion made to
me in a personal communication from Benjamin J.
Sadock, MD.
Finally, the definition in Zhong et al. includes a
novel criterion: the desire to make restitution. Making restitution would surely be a logical corollary of
feeling remorse, but it does not seem to be part of
remorse itself.
For all these reasons, I fear that the definition
given to the judges was not as precise and relevant to
the criminal context as it could have been. I might
attribute the great variability in the judges’ responses
to these difficulties, but judicial discretion leads to
great variability, even when criteria are clearer, because judges inject the same criteria with different
moral and social meaning. I shall return to this theme
in a later section, but will use my OED-based interpretation of remorse as the foundation for further
reflections on the role of remorse in criminal justice.
Remorse and the Justifications for Blame
and Punishment
Blaming and punishing an agent for committing
a crime is the most afflictive, awesome exercise of the
power of the state over an individual. Punishment
involves not only the stigma of blame, but it also
most fundamentally includes the intentional infliction of some form of harm or pain on the convicted
person. If anything requires moral justification, it is
the intentional stigmatizing and inflicting of pain on
50

an agent. In response to such moral concerns, theorists have offered many potential candidates for justifying punishment. These are loosely placed in two
categories: nonconsequential or deontological and
consequential. The former includes retribution or
just deserts. The latter includes general prevention,
specific prevention, and some forms of rehabilitation. These various justifications can lead to differing
conclusions. For example, a mentally disordered but
culpable defendant may deserve less retributive
blame and punishment because his rational capacities are compromised, but the same abnormality
might make him especially dangerous and thus a
good candidate for extended incarceration to prevent
him from committing further crimes.
Many jurisdictions list the justifications in the
penal code that the legislature has decided should be
adopted, and judges explicitly use the justifications
in sentencing decisions, but they typically do not
explain why they adopt particular justifications and
virtually never set forth an algorithm for how they
should be balanced. This deficit is not important for
our present purposes, but I discuss it in the penultimate section of the paper.
Let us consider the justifications and their relations to remorse.
Nonconsequential/Deontological Justification
Retribution

Retribution is a theory of justice: giving criminal
offenders their just deserts for what they have culpably done is justice. A retributive or just-deserts rationale imposes a deserved punishment because it is
right in itself to give a culpable offender what he
deserves. Although there may be consequential constraints on desert in extreme cases, retributive punishment ignores whether good consequences will follow from giving the offender his just deserts. There
are many different versions of retributivism. For example, giving people their just deserts can be either
obligatory or permissive. For another example, some
retributivists think that the amount of harm a defendant causes is relevant to deciding what blame and
punishment the offender deserves; others believe that
only the offender’s wrong conduct and not the harm
it causes is relevant. As a deontological theory, retribution is similar to deontological theories in other
areas of law, such as the obligation to keep one’s
promise in contract law, even if breaching might
be efficient. Retribution includes a proportionality
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principle. No offender should be punished more
than he deserves. Thus, retributivists are opposed
in principle to criminal liability for strict-liability
crimes because defendants convicted of such crimes
are not culpable and do not deserve to be punished.
Retribution is often confused with, but is most decidedly not, revenge. Revenge is the crude psychological satisfaction that comes from hurting those
who have hurt the victim. It is not a justification for
legal punishment, which involves doing justice impartially and fairly. Finally, retributively justified
punishment need not be harsh. Retributivists can be
tender or tough. Few theorists are pure retributivists,
and, to the best of my knowledge, no jurisdiction has
implicitly or explicitly adopted retributivism as its
sole justification for punishment, but virtually all believe that it is a necessary precondition for punishment, even if it is not sufficient.
Is retribution intended to give offenders what they
deserve for what they have done or for who they are,
for their characters? It is often said that acts are expressive of character, but we know that seemingly
good people sometimes do terrible things. Does this
mean that the heinous act is less terrible and more
justifiable or excusable or does it mean that our previous evaluation of the perpetrator’s character was
incorrect? I will ignore the debate about whether
character or the situation most accounts for the variance in an individual’s behavior and will assume that
character plays a substantial role and that situational
causation is no more of an excuse, per se, than any
other kind of causation.
What does it mean to say that an act is out of
character if an unjustified and unexcused agent has
intentionally committed a crime? How do we decide
what the agent’s enduring behavioral predispositions
are except by observing their actions over time and
across situations? Further, as a set of behavioral predispositions, character is a status, and in our constitutional order, it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to punish for one’s status alone, such as being a
drug addict.6
A retributive justification based on the offender’s
past acts is retrospective because it focuses on what
the offender has already done in the past. The question is what he deserves for the crime he has committed. Remorse is always expressed after the wrongful
deed has been done. Therefore, if one takes an actoriented view of retribution, remorse is irrelevant,
simply because nothing the offender does after the

crime is committed affects the crime itself and what
the offender deserves for committing it. Before acting, the offender should have brought to mind and
been guided by the moral considerations that later
caused remorse. In that case, the agent would not
have committed the crime, would not deserve punishment, and would have no need for regret.
If one adopts a character-based theory of retribution, it is difficult to understand why the offender’s
sentence should be altered. The expression of genuine remorse may speak well of the offender’s postcrime character, it may help restore the defendant’s
breach with the victim and society, and recognition
that it has occurred may acknowledge the offender’s
rationality and autonomy, but it is nonetheless hard
to understand why the deserved sentence should be
affected on grounds of desert. We are punishing the
offender for what he has done. Moreover, as discussed in greater detail later in the article, it is difficult to know whether the offender is genuinely remorseful and what his character really is. Perhaps it
has morally eroded and it is not clear that remorse,
even if apparently genuine, indicates that his character has reverted to the apparent status quo ante. Sometimes we must be judged by our one-offs. As Nick
Hornby wrote in his novel, How To Be Good,7 it
would not have done for Lee Harvey Oswald to claim
that he was not ordinarily the sort of person who
killed presidents. Finally, remorse may seem to have
more purchase for reducing sentences according to
a communicative justification of punishment tied to
retributive desert, but its primary proponent denies
that this is true, a recent proponent acknowledges
that remorse may be best justified consequentially,8
and no jurisdiction has adopted this view.
Consequential Justifications
Deterrence and Incapacitation

If we want to justify the use of remorse in sentencing, we must do so on consequential grounds. General deterrence, specific deterrence, and incapacitation are the primary consequential justifications in
Anglo-American penal law. As is well known, general
deterrence is a method of crime prevention that seeks
to use the potential pain of punishment to give all
people reason not to offend. Special deterrence and
incapacitation are methods of specific prevention
that are used to prevent offenders from committing
further offenses by giving them good reason not to
or by keeping them incarcerated. These justifications
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succeed only if a punishment practice in fact achieves
the goal of prevention. If it does not, the punishment
is unjustified on consequential grounds. Consequentialism also has a proportionality principle. No more
pain should be inflicted on the offender than is necessary to maximize social welfare. Any punishment
beyond the minimum necessary for that purpose is
disproportionate. Consequential justifications identify the good consequence that is desired. Most
broadly, the good consequence is considered to be
social welfare. This theory then holds that an action
is justified if the net result is achieving or maximizing
the good. There are theorists who propose a purely
consequential justification of punishment, but with
limited exceptions, no jurisdiction has adopted such
a view. An exception might be enhanced sentences
for recidivists, although many retributivists attracted
to this practice have tried unsuccessfully to provide a
retributivist justification. Punishment for strict-liability crimes is also justified purely consequentially.
The question concerning the effect of remorse on
consequential justifications is empirical. Does remorse or its absence validly predict whether the offender is less or more dangerous and thus should
receive a lesser or greater sentence (holding every
other variable constant)? When remorse is used for
mitigation, the consequential goals may lead to inconsistent results. Remorse that leads to lesser sentences because remorseful defendants are less likely to
recidivate may also have the effect of undermining
general deterrence, because the criminal law may be
seen as soft or easy to manipulate by faked emotions.
If lack of remorse is associated with enhanced danger
of recidivism, then general and special prevention
would both be achieved by lengthening the sentences
of such offenders.
Assuming that we can accurately judge when remorse is genuine and what its depth and quality are,
a question to which I return in the next section, as
Zhong et al. rightly note, the consequential outcomes of using remorse are almost entirely speculative. Guilt does seem to be protective against further
criminal conduct,9 but the data on remorse specifically are sparse. One epidemiological study found a
modest association between lack of remorse and antisocial conduct,10 but it was not a prospective study.
The major exception to this generally cautious conclusion may be the callous/unemotional (CU) factor
in psychopathy, which includes deficient remorse. It
has been long known that psychopathy is a signifi52

cant risk factor for future criminal conduct, but the
specific role of CU was unknown. A recent study
controlled for the other relevant variables and found
that CU was associated with incrementally enhanced
recidivism risk,11 but CU includes more than deficient remorse, and it is unclear how much of the
variance remorse accounted for. These data are suggestive, but we must still conclude that the association between remorse alone and recidivism is unknown. Moreover, we do not know whether the
association, if valid, is smoothly scalar or is distributed differently.
We have no valid data to indicate how using remorse as a mitigating factor that leads to reduce sentences would affect general deterrence. Moreover, if
there were inconsistent results between the gain to
the offender and the loss to society, can we really
calculate the social welfare outcome? Of course, such
skeptical concerns about the ability actually to calculate net social welfare are a staple of anti-consequential thought. At present, then, no sentencing judge
could use remorse on empirically valid and thus principled consequential grounds.
Nonpaternalistic and Paternalistic Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation is a currently disfavored consequential justification and has been so for about four
decades. In the late 1960s and early 1970s there was
an unusual bipartisan agreement that in large part
blamed rehabilitation theory and its empirical failures for arbitrary sentencing discretion. The bipartisan consensus was largely responsible for the resurgence of the just-deserts model of sentencing and the
limitation of judicial and parole discretion. Nonetheless, rehabilitation always retains strong proponents,
the efficacy data turn out to be less pessimistic than it
first appears, and the justification pendulum can and
always does swing in criminal justice.
Rehabilitation can be either nonpaternalistic (or
nonparentalistic if one prefers the ungendered locution) or paternalistic. In the former, we impose rehabilitative interventions on the offender to render
him less dangerous, whether he likes it or not. We
straightforwardly acknowledge that we are violating
the offender’s autonomy and are manipulating
him for our good, not his. A Clockwork Orange,12 in
which a psychopathic, violent predator is trained by
classical conditioning to become ill when presented
with violent stimuli, is a classic example. This is
clearly a consequential justification based on the cost
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savings achieved if an effective treatment is less expensive than continued incarceration. It is a form of
specific prevention. The major problems are that effective rehabilitation methods are expensive, they do
not work for everyone and we cannot identify in
advance the promising candidates, and most methods are not very effective. There are promising exceptions, however, and as data accumulate, this form of
consequential justification may again play a larger
role in the justification of punishment.
In the case of paternalistic rehabilitation, the goal
is to improve the offender so that he can lead a better
life and flourish. For several reasons, this justification
has no proper role to play as a prima facie justification
for punishment. Most fundamentally, paternalistic
rehabilitation is not a form of the intentional infliction of pain, and thus it is not a state punishment,
even if the offender experiences it as such. Second, in
a liberal society, paternalistic interventions are disfavored generally, and most prisoners are not among
the classes of individuals, such as minors or people
with dementia, for whom paternalism is justified because they are not responsible agents. Third, in a
world of limited, scarce resources, it is unfair to provide benefits to those who least deserve them and
especially because the offender may not want the
benefits. Finally, characterizing punishment as a
treatment for the offender’s own good promotes a
form of moral blindness that allows us to manipulate
people in unacceptable ways. This outcome is always
a danger of medicalizing a moral or social problem,
such as how to respond to so-called mentally abnormal, sexually violent predators.
The problem of the relation of remorse to rehabilitation is the same as besets the relation of remorse
to other consequential justifications. There is simply
no evidence that a genuinely remorseful offender is a
better candidate for nonpaternalistic rehabilitation
than an offender who is not remorseful. Once again,
remorse can play no principled role in a sentencing
decision guided by a rehabilitative justification.
Mixed Justifications
A mixed justification of punishment attempts to
blend retributivism and consequentialism. Although
many claim that mixed justifications are incoherent,13 it is probably the dominant form of justification used today. I confess to being a muzzy-headed,
mixed theorist, myself. The most usual form acknowledges that retribution has no theory to provide

a single fixed amount of punishment for each crime
type. Rather, it sets a range of proportionate punishment for crimes. An offender should receive at least
the minimum but not more than the maximum of
the deserved range. Within the range, consequential
justifications can be used to adjust the sentence up or
down within the range For example, more dangerous
offenders may receive sentences toward the higher
end of the range and vice versa.
Remorse fares no better as a principled ground for
sentencing under the mixed justification than it did
under either of the two pure categories, for the obvious reason that if it cannot be properly used by either
alone, no moral alchemy makes it viable if one tries to
blend justifications.
Remorse and Forensic Practice
Mock studies with college student subjects, which
may be of limited ecological validity,14 show that the
study subjects take remorse into account in making
judgments about criminal responsibility and punishment,15,16 and many sentencing judges take remorse
into account. These facts are positive, not normative,
however. I have suggested that, at present, the law
should not consider remorse when making decisions
about an offender’s fate because there is apparently
no good justification for doing so. Nonetheless, in
the discussion that follows, I shall assume that, as a
practical matter, remorse will be considered. It seems
that there would then be two roles for forensic psychiatrists. The first would be to help identify whether
an offender is in fact remorseful. The second would
be to do research that would create a reliable and
valid instrument for identifying remorse and then to
determine whether remorse is a valid indicator of one
or more of the consequential justifications of punishment. Let us consider these two roles.
The question the first role raises is whether forensic psychiatrists and psychologists have special expertise, qua forensic psychiatrists and psychologists, in
identifying genuine remorse and its depth and character. I know of no study that addresses this question
specifically, and a search of PubMed disclosed none.
For various reasons, I believe we should be cautious
before claiming that we have special expertise or before offering our services for the purpose of evaluating remorse.
Remorse is mostly not a mental health concept. It
is what is often termed a moral emotion. In the entire
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
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ders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5), it receives only one
mention, as the diagnostically unnecessary (because
the diagnosis can be made without this criterion being satisfied) seventh criterion for antisocial personality disorder (APD) (Ref. 17, pp 659 – 63). Lack
of remorse is indicated by “being indifferent to or
rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen. . . .”
With all respect, this criterion is vague. For example,
how indifferent must the subject be and what will
count as a sufficient rationalization? The relatively
good reliability of APD does not obviate this problem, and it does not address remorse specifically.
There is no entry for remorse in the American Psychiatric Publishing volume, The Language of Mental
Health: A Glossary of Psychiatric Terms.18 Although I
have no study to prove this point, I am quite certain
that the evaluation of remorse plays a trivial role in
most psychiatry and psychology clinical training, including specialty training in forensic practice; but my
supposition may be inaccurate. Finally, because lack
of remorse is not really a psychiatric or psychological
symptom, studies concerning the identification of
malingering of psychopathology are inapposite.
Psychopathy, which is a relatively well-characterized condition and best measured by the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R),19 is not a recognized DSM disorder, but it may seem to provide
an exception to the cautious concern about lack of
special expertise. One of its 20 items is “lack of remorse or guilt,” which is itself part of what is called
the affective facet, the same facet that includes callousness and lack of empathy. The PCL-R has excellent overall interrater reliability among trained users,
but there is reason to question whether the reliability
is as good in applied forensic settings as in research
studies, and few field trials of reliability have provided scores for the subscales or individual items.20
In the most recent report of an applied field trial with
relatively few subjects, the overall reliability was
moderately good, but the reliability of the lack of
remorse item among highly trained clinicians was
only 0.51, with a large confidence interval, and the
reliability of the affective facet was only 0.59 overall.21 Indeed, the only facet of the instrument that
has genuinely good reliability, the antisocial facet,
measures essentially antisocial conduct, a more objectively identifiable set of variables that do not measure remorse.
I thus conclude, on the basis of the currently available data, that forensic professionals possess no spe54

cial expertise in evaluating remorse and that we
should proceed with caution in this domain.
The second role for forensic mental health professionals would be to develop an instrument that
would reliably and validly measure remorse and then
to determine whether it is a valid indicator of future
dangerousness and amenability to rehabilitation.
That task is for the future, however.
Judicial Discretion
Zhong et al.1 strikingly confirmed that judges use
widely different sentencing criteria in very different
ways and impose markedly different sentences in
similar cases, even if the sentencing criteria have been
identified in advance. Although the virtues and vices
of judicial sentencing discretion are not a central concern in forensic psychiatry, it is worth a brief discussion because it affects how our work is treated in
criminal cases and because forensic psychiatrists and
psychologists are often asked for their input concerning the criminal process.
Unequal treatment was a large part of the motivation of the bipartisan movement in the 1960s and
1970s to limit judicial discretion in various ways.
Disparate judicial treatment of like cases was one of
the foundations for the imposition of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines in federal criminal cases. The
mandatory nature of the guidelines was declared unconstitutional for complicated reasons in 2005 in
United States v. Booker,22 but the guidelines were
retained as advisory, and federal judges are expected
to operate within them, although they are not bound
by them. The result has been guideline creep, to wit,
the reintroduction of substantial sentencing disparities in like cases. In Zhong et al., the judges ranged
remarkably widely in how they applied the same definition of remorse. In light of the history of judicial
discretion about sentencing, this is entirely unsurprising and entirely unsettling. Experienced criminal
lawyers know that most criminal defendants care
more about whether and how long they will be imprisoned than about whether they will be convicted.
Unjustified disparities in sentencing are, quite simply, unjust.
Judges are human beings who have their own perceptions and value systems. Sentencing criteria,
when they exist, are often vague, and there is seldom
an algorithm for how to weigh and balance the various factors. It is thus no surprise that sentencing
judges are shaped by their implicit or explicit under-
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lying justifications for punishment that are in turn
shaped by the judges’ unique histories. They will
wittingly or unwittingly create their own criteria or
infuse existing criteria with their subjective meanings
and values. Only the most constraining legislative
limits can prevent such exercises of discretion. In the
worst cases, judges may be swayed unconsciously by
unacknowledged prejudice. I am not suggesting that
judges act in bad faith when they sentence. Virtually
none does, I believe. Virtually all state and federal
trial judges who I have talked to over the years recognize the extraordinary power that they possess over
the liberty and well-being of convicted offenders, and
they try to sentence in a principled and fair manner.
For the reasons given, however, even if every judge
behaved that way, the disparities would still be broad.
The argument to the contrary is that each crime is
unique and so many factors may be considered at
sentencing that no set of criteria that impose severe
constraints could conceivably do proper justice. Unless one had a theory about how all of the potential
sentencing factors should affect sentences and how
they should all be weighed and balanced, this account of justice is, with all respect, a pipe dream. We
would all like to believe that there are people who by
dint of rigorous training and professional experience
can be trusted to make wise, fair decisions. Unfortunately, as noted, legislatures seldom make clear what
theory of justice is guiding the adoption, weighing,
and balancing of possible sentencing factors. Thus,
in most cases, each judge applies an individualized
theory of justice and account of punishment.
Even if my diagnosis of the ills of sentencing is
accurate, and many would disagree, the solution remains unclear. It is possible to wring virtually all
discretion out of sentencing, but that will not prevent
law enforcement officials and prosecutors from exercising their discretion. Charging decisions are a notorious example of a situation in which discretion
and disparities abound. Perhaps, however, we should
put our jurisprudential pants on one leg at a time and
reduce unjustified discretion when and where we can.
Conclusion
Remorse is a familiar concept and a moral emotion
that judges and laypeople alike use in judging others.
Zhong et al. have provided an impetus to reflect on
the use of remorse by judges at sentencing and to
conclude that, at present, this practice is almost impossible to defend normatively. I have also suggested

that the evidence to date does not support the conclusion that forensic mental health professionals have
special expertise concerning the evaluation of remorse. Finally, I bemoaned the sentencing disparities
resulting from judicial discretion that Zhong et al.
have so manifestly confirmed, but observed that, as a
practical matter, judicial discretion will continue.
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